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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The vast expansion of international law over the last three decades has 
highlighted various tensions among the different norms of international 
law.1  Commitments to liberalize trade barriers under World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements clash with trade restrictions justified 
 
 *  Carmen E. Pavel is a postdoctoral fellow in the program in Political Philosophy, 
Policy & Law at the University of Virginia.  She specializes in liberal theory, international 
justice, and the morality of international institutions.  She would like to thank Larry A. 
Alexander, Steven D. Smith, and Maimon Schwarzschild for organizing the conference 
for which this article was prepared, Steven D. Smith for offering constructive criticism, 
and the other conference participants for providing feedback. 
 1. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); 
RÜDIGER WOLFRUM & NELE MATZ, CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(2003); Jan B. Mus, Conflicts Between Treaties in International Law, 45 NETH. INT’L L. 
REV. 208 (1998). 
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under environmental treaties.2  Self-determination rights for national 
minorities clash with states’ rights to territorial integrity.3  The efforts of 
international institutions to protect the human rights of individuals or 
groups in abusive regimes are in tension with these regimes’ demands 
for respect for sovereign independence.  Debates over the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention confront precisely this last case of conflict.4 
Legal conflicts may reflect deeper conflicts of moral values: individual 
human rights and collective self-determination, economic freedom and 
environmental protection, human health and economic freedom, and so 
on.  Legal conflicts can be traced to more fundamental moral conflicts, 
which are deeply entrenched in the structure of our moral universe.  This 
fact has profound consequences for the way that we understand and 
settle legal conflicts.  Domestically, legal conflicts are settled in part by 
resorting to legal and institutional hierarchies, such as a constitution and 
a supreme court.  No such formal hierarchies are available at the 
international level.  Once we acknowledge the potential intractability of 
legal conflict and the distinct institutional structure of international law, 
the question of how to settle legal conflicts takes on a new urgency. 
In this paper, I will engage this question in several steps.  In Part II, I 
will illustrate the problem of conflict in international law by drawing on 
two cases in international trade law.  I will then argue in Parts III and IV 
that legal conflict often represents a genuine normative conflict grounded in 
our multiple, incommensurable, and potentially conflicting moral 
commitments.  In doing so, I will deflect potential skepticism about the 
reality of normative conflict in international law.  Drawing from existing 
international legal practice, I will show in Part IV that we can resort to a 
substantial toolbox of rules and principles to reconcile legal norms that 
are in tension with one another.  Finally, in Part V, I will evaluate the 
institutional implications of these normative tensions for international 
law. 
 
 2. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 20. 
 3. Kosovo’s disputes with Serbia over its right to territory are a case in point.  For 
an analysis of the historical evolution of the right to self-determination using Kosovo as 
an example, see Helen Quane, A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?, 
13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 219 (2000). 
 4. Whether or not it is acceptable to hold political leaders of a country 
accountable for inflicting harm on their own citizens in international tribunals in order to 
protect human rights is a normative question central to the entire body of international 
criminal law.  On this point, see LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A 
NORMATIVE ACCOUNT (2005); Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A 
Defense of International Criminal Law, 115 ETHICS 35 (2004). 
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II.  THE CONFLICTS 
International law has a distinct character.  Unlike domestic law systems, 
it does not have a hierarchical, centralized institutional structure 
for legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing the law.  The international 
law system is comprised of general international law, such as the U.N. 
Charter, and special law, such as trade law, human rights law, 
environmental law, law of the sea, and international refugee law.  
Groups of treaties on the same topic are considered legal regimes, and 
often have their own lawmaking, dispute resolution, and law 
enforcement mechanisms.5  The legal regimes that make up international 
law develop in relative isolation from one another, and have their own 
set of goals and concerns embodied in their legal norms.  Consequently, 
it is not always clear how these different norms will interact with one 
another. 
Inevitably, conflicts occur between two laws that are part of general 
law, between general law and special law, between the laws of two 
different regimes, and even between the laws of the same regime—say, 
between two norms of WTO law.6  The increased scattering in international 
law has provoked concerns about its ability to work as a coherent body 
of rules.  Acknowledging this challenge, the General Assembly of the 
U.N. authorized its International Law Commission to produce a study 
entitled Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law.7 
Whether directly or indirectly, the legal regimes that make up 
international law protect significant moral interests and therefore reflect 
moral values.  Human rights, the protection of the environment, and 
 
 5. Stephen D. Krasner used the term regime to describe treaty subsystems.  See 
Stephen D. Krasner, Preface to INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, at vii, viii (Stephen D. Krasner 
ed., 2d prtg. 1984). 
 6. This last case of conflict of legal norms within a regime, although much less 
prevalent, can be explained by the fact that international legal regimes are themselves 
very complex bodies of law made up of multiple treaties that change and evolve over 
time.  These treaties give rise not only to rights and obligations, but also to permission 
and restrictions, all of which can come into conflict.  This phenomenon reflects the 
dynamic character of international law, still considered to be in the early phases of its 
development and marked by rapid expansion and frequent change. 
 7. U.N. Gen. Assembly, Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) 
[hereinafter Fragmentation Study]. 
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collective self-determination are values that correspond to human rights 
law, environmental law, and laws protecting sovereign immunity, 
respectively.  These three examples show that moral values can be 
plainly traced to specific treaties or regimes in international law.  
Nonetheless, the connection between moral values and legal norms or 
regimes is not always this obvious.  Trade law, for instance, is instrumental 
to the promotion of a number of other values: individual autonomy, 
freedom of contract, human well-being, and increased living standards.  
Diplomatic law regulates the obligations of states regarding the facilities, 
privileges, and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions, and 
specifies the acceptable means at their disposal to respond when other 
states fall short in their diplomatic obligations.  As such, diplomatic law 
indirectly supports the peaceful coexistence among diverse people, 
which is itself a moral goal. 
Legal conflict among different norms of international law does not 
always amount to a normative conflict.  First of all, not all cases that 
seem like a conflict at first glance are actual conflicts of legal norms in 
international law.  Sometimes the apparent conflict is only a divergence 
that can be streamlined by means of treaty interpretation.8  Second, not 
all legal conflict is normative conflict.  Different treaties in international 
law can specify different norms of due process, for instance, that may 
come into conflict.  The conflict in this case is not between two different 
moral values but between two ways of realizing the same value. 
Nonetheless, as long as certain moral values are enshrined in the law, 
one can identify a link between legal conflict on the one hand—which is 
conflict of legally binding norms of international law—and normative 
conflict on the other hand—which is a conflict between the values 
protected by those legal norms.  Two cases that have been submitted for 
arbitration before WTO panels can help to illustrate the normative 
conflict between trade law and environmental law.  The WTO dispute 
settlement system is invoked whenever a member country believes 
another country has violated a WTO agreement.  It represents a formal 
process that involves several stages.  First, countries are asked to resort to 
consultation and mediation within a certain time frame in an effort 
to solve their disagreements amicably.  If consultation is not successful 
within the give time frame, the next stage involves submitting the 
dispute to a panel that will rule on it.  The parties can appeal the ruling 
of the panel to the permanent, seven-member Appellate Body, of which 
three members are assigned to each case.  After reconsidering the legal 
 
 8. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 6. 
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matters at hand, the Appellate Body can uphold, modify, or reverse the 
panel’s legal findings and conclusions.9  The following cases, EC—
Asbestos and United States—Shrimp, can help to explain the general 
implications of normative conflict for international law. 
A.  EC—Asbestos10 
Chrysotile asbestos is a material with resistance to high temperature 
that provides good electrical and acoustic insulation, properties that 
make it valuable for uses in various industries.11  But asbestos is also 
considered a carcinogen associated with lung cancer, and as such it can 
pose serious threats to human health.12  Canada, the second largest 
producer of chrysotile asbestos in the world,13 initiated this case against 
the European Communities (EC) to reverse a French ban on asbestos 
fibers and products containing asbestos.14  The EC defended the ban on 
the grounds that asbestos is not only harmful to workers subject to 
prolonged exposure but also to those who are casually exposed to it.15  
The WTO panel ruled in favor of the EC and the Appellate Body 
affirmed the ruling on appeal.16 
 
 9. For a more detailed description of the WTO dispute settlement procedure, see 
KEVIN BUTERBAUGH & RICHARD FULTON, THE WTO PRIMER: TRACING TRADE’S VISIBLE 
HAND THROUGH CASE STUDIES 72–78 (2007). 
 10. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate 
Body Report, EC—Asbestos].  For a discussion of the ways trade and environmental legal 
norms interact and summaries of cases, see NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A GUIDE TO WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2006); KEVIN C. 
KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (2009). 
 11. Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, supra note 10, para. 114. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 3.20, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 14. Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, supra note 10, para. 1. 
 15. Id. para. 19. 
 16. Id. para. 193. 
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B.  United States—Shrimp17 
In this case, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand challenged the 
United States ban on shrimp captured without turtle excluder devices 
(TEDs) before the WTO.  The United States invoked a number of 
multilateral environmental treaties in defense of its ban on shrimp 
coming from countries that did not take sufficient measures to protect 
endangered animals such as turtles.18  The WTO Appellate Body decided 
that the United States could restrict trade for environmental reasons—to 
protect human health, endangered species, and plant life.19  The Appellate 
Body claimed: “We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are 
Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered 
species, such as sea turtles.  Clearly, they can and should.”20  The United 
States was ordered however to temporarily lift the ban on grounds of 
discrimination.  The reasoning was that the United States provided 
countries in the Caribbean with technical and financial assistance and 
longer transition periods to start using TEDs; however, it failed to give 
the same advantage to the four Asian countries that filed the complaint.21  
The United States was asked to give to the Asian countries time to adjust to 
the new import requirements.22 
 
Both of these cases reflect conflicts between two values enshrined in 
two different international law subsystems.  On the one hand, the WTO 
promotes trade liberalization as a path to economic development.  Open 
trade gives more access for developing countries to the vast markets of 
developed countries.  Trade is promoted by the WTO as a means to 
provide better employment opportunities, to give underdeveloped and 
developing countries access to medicine and education, and to raise the 
standards of living and improve overall human well-being.  On the other 
 
 17. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Shrimp 1]; 
Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, Shrimp 2]. 
 18. Panel Report, Shrimp 1, supra note 17, para. 3.94. 
 19. Panel Report, Shrimp 2, supra note 17, para. 185.  The WTO Appellate Body 
referred in its decision to a number of international treaties in order to interpret the 
notion of “exhaustible natural resources” at the heart of this debate.  Sources included 
the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the Biodiversity Convention of 1992, and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 
168.  
 20. Panel Report, Shrimp 2, supra note 17, para. 185. 
 21. Id. paras. 175–176. 
 22. Id. 
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hand, environmental treaties protect the integrity of ecosystems, natural 
resources, animal and plant life, and human health. 
Caring for our planet’s resources and creating economic prosperity 
through trade are both valuable goals, but the relationship between them 
is complex.  Although these two goals are in tension with one another, it 
would be an overstatement to say that an inherent conflict exists between 
them.  By inherent conflict, I mean that the values themselves are always 
impossible to reconcile and any two practical instantiations of those 
values are going to be incompatible.  Rather, the two values are in potential 
conflict, and whether a conflict emerges at all depends on the nature of 
the legal rules and the context in which those rules are applied.  To 
understand why this is a potential and not an inherent conflict, consider the 
following.  There are ways in which trade and environmental protection can 
reinforce each other.  As technology and science develop, economic growth 
can generate products that can significantly reduce pollution, minimize 
resource use, and substitute safer substances for toxic ones.  Economic 
development can thus contribute to environmental improvements. 
However, there are numerous instances in which the two goals are in 
conflict.  On the one hand, many industries pollute heavily, economic 
growth sometimes leads to resource depletion, and as human activities 
expand geographically, entire natural habitats are affected.  On the other 
hand, environmental regulations are often costly on businesses 
because environmental standards affect the level of productivity and the 
volume of trade.  This conflict between economic development and 
environmental protection is most acute in developing countries, which 
severely need both.  Empirical research has identified an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between economic development and environmental 
health.23  This phenomenon is called the “Environmental Kuznets Curve.”  
Especially concerning local pollutants, early stages of economic 
development are correlated to higher levels of pollution.24  As economic 
productivity and GDP per capita increase, the studies found a turning 
point at which the trend reverses and pollution decreases.25  This means 
that at least in the early stages of economic development, high 
 
 23. Hemamala Hettige et al., The Toxic Intensity of Industrial Production: Global 
Patterns, Trends, and Trade Policy, AM. ECON. REV., May 1992, at 478, 478–79. 
 24. See Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the 
Environment, 110 Q.J. ECON. 353, 366–68, 370 (1995). 
 25. See generally id.; Hettige et al., supra note 23. 
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pollution is strongly correlated with economic development, but the 
correlation weakens as a country’s economy progresses. 
Just as environmental protection and trade are in potential conflict, 
other moral values are potentially conflicting.  Legal norms that realize a 
certain value interact with legal norms that realize other values in 
complex and often unpredictable ways.  Even if some conflicts can be 
anticipated and addressed in the law, it is impossible to foresee how a 
new norm will interact with every existing norm, given the sheer number 
of norms and their sometimes vague nature, so normative conflict in the 
law is inevitable. 
III.  SKEPTICISM ABOUT NORMATIVE CONFLICT 
If the conflict between trade law and environmental law reflects a 
deeper conflict of moral values, this suggests that, at least partially, legal 
conflict is explained by a more general pattern of conflict in moral 
reasoning.  Normative conflict itself is the result of the pluralistic nature 
of the moral universe.  Our moral world is made up of many 
incommensurable values that come into conflict with one another at times.  
Justice and friendship, duties to others and obligations to oneself, hedonism 
and frugality are examples of goods or values that come into conflict.  
This idea is, of course, recognizable from Isaiah Berlin’s work.26  He has 
made the idea of moral pluralism vivid to the moral imagination of 
twentieth-century moral philosophy.  Berlin strongly believed in the 
reality of moral conflict, and so did those thinkers inspired by Berlin who 
have subsequently embraced pluralism.27 
Pluralism is an attractive view precisely because it resonates better 
with our everyday moral experience, its defenders claim.  If this deep, 
underlying conflict of moral requirements is part of the structure of the 
moral universe, and not just a result of muddled thinking, or apparent 
conflict easily cleared up by more sustained rational scrutiny, then we 
 
 26. See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). 
 27. See, e.g., GEORGE CROWDER, ISAIAH BERLIN: LIBERTY AND PLURALISM (2004); 
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM 
FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2002); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF 
LIBERAL PLURALISM (2005); STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT (1983); 
JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF 
MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); STEVEN LUKES, MORAL CONFLICT AND POLITICS (1991); 
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF 
GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (rev. ed. 2001); 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND 
CONFLICTING VALUES (1990); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981). 
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should strive for a view of morality that more accurately reflects this 
reality. 
However, the idea that legal conflict is derived from a deep and 
fundamental moral conflict is unsettling.  Conflicts lead to indeterminacy, 
and indeterminacy leads to uncertainty about what the law requires.  
Therefore, the first reaction one may have to claims of normative conflict is 
one of skepticism.  Skepticism can take several forms.  It may be 
tempting to treat all cases of normative conflict, including the conflict 
between trade and environmental values, as illusory conflicts that may 
be cleared up by appropriate reflection on the nature of those values, on 
the proper hierarchy between them, or on the necessity of the laws that 
ensure their achievement in practice.  Thus conflict is merely the result 
of (1) an improper understanding of the reality of those values, (2) the 
relationship between them, or (3) the way they are expressed and interpreted 
in legal practice. 
Let me address these skepticisms in turn.  Let us call the first form of 
skepticism the “genuine values” view.  In the case in which two values 
seem to be in conflict, the conflict is apparent because only one of the 
values is an actual or genuine value and the other is not.  If only one is a 
value, then the apparent conflict dissolves because the proper course of 
action is to follow the legal norm that upholds the genuine value.  For 
example, the conflict between environmental protection and trade would 
dissolve if we acknowledge that only environmental protection has value 
and trade has none.  Conflict is nonexistent in this case. 
According to a second form of skepticism, which I shall call the 
“hierarchical view,” a proper understanding of the relationship between 
the two values can easily clear up the conflict.  Adequate reasoning 
would show that there is no actual indeterminacy as to which is more 
valuable: either environmental protection trumps trade or vice versa.  
And real-life debates about the merits of these two goals are rife with 
extreme positions on both sides, which reflect this kind of hierarchical 
understanding of morality.  For example, radical supporters of the 
environment argue that economic activity needs to be significantly 
curtailed in order to preserve our natural habitat.28  The preservation of 
 
 28. Supporters of “deep ecology” argue, for instance, that nature has an intrinsic 
value, which exists independently of humans’ recognizing its importance.  Because 
economic development has no such intrinsic value, it often follows that it must be 
subordinated to preserving the environment.  See MARIA MIES & VANDANA SHIVA, 
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the Earth must come first, even if it confines humanity to poverty.  On 
the other side, those who believe trade and economic development should 
be the primary goal argue that any environmental damage is offset by 
economic benefits.29  Both are unreasonable in my view. 
I grouped the two kinds of skepticism together because the pluralist 
has the same reply to both.  On the pluralist account, the idea that 
economic development must be strictly subordinated to environmental 
protection, or that economic benefits always offset environmental costs, 
are both problematic.  Both ends are valuable, and there is no way to 
judge the relative value of one versus the other and establish a permanent 
order of priority.  The two ends are incommensurable.  That is, there is 
no common measure of value or medium in terms of which values can 
be expressed and ranked across all possible situations. 
This is not to say that the two ends can never be comparable.30  States 
need and can ascertain their relative importance so that they have a 
useful guide for policy.  One way of ranking is to measure them along a 
one-dimensional scale, such as money.  One can judge losses to the 
environment and economic gains in monetary terms, and compare them 
along this line.  Cost-benefit analysis is one way to compare the two 
ends, and there may be others equally helpful in ascertaining the proper 
course of action when the two ends come into conflict.  Still, cost-benefit 
analysis fails to capture the fact that the two ends are not substitutable in 
any simple sense.  There is gain and loss that comes with any possible 
trade-off, and “[w]hat one loses is of a different kind from what one 
gains.”31  More economic development does not “make up” for a 
damaged environment; it just responds to other things that people need 
and value. 
The hidden assumption prevalent in some cost-benefit calculations is 
that so long as one plans correctly and succeeds, there is no loss of any 
kind.  This is simply wrong when one deals with heterogeneous values.  
 
ECOFEMINISM 57–64 (1993); see generally ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND 
LIFESTYLE: OUTLINE OF AN ECOSOPHY (David Rothenberg trans., 1989); Freya Mathews, 
Letting the World Grow Old: An Ethos of Countermodernity, 3 WORLDVIEWS: ENV’T, 
CULTURE, RELIGION 119 (1999) (advocating a “countermodernist” approach); cf. Murray 
Bookchin, Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology, SOCIALIST REV., July–Sept. 1988, at 9, 
13–25 (expressing a critical view of deep ecology).  
 29. See, e.g., WILFRED BECKERMAN, THROUGH GREEN-COLORED GLASSES: 
ENVIRONMENTALISM RECONSIDERED 197 (1996). 
 30. For a discussion of commensurability and comparability, see the collection of 
essays in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth 
Chang ed., 1997). 
 31. JOSEPH RAZ, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 170, 179 (rev. ed. 2001). 
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Monetary evaluations are at best imperfect approximations of value.  
Some benefits of a clean environment, such as aesthetic appreciation or 
health benefits to individuals, are not even translatable in monetary 
terms.  However useful the cost-benefit analysis is for some purposes, it 
remains a partial evaluation of trade-offs and does not adequately 
capture the full, multidimensional value of each end.  Crucially, even if 
we compare the relative worth of the two ends, those calculations are 
bound to take different factors into account in different contexts, such as 
the level of environmental damage present in a region, the state of 
natural resources, their rate of regeneration, and also the relative level of 
economic development, all of which will differ from area to area.  These 
differences will in turn generate a whole range of trade-offs between the 
two ends that cannot be easily reduced to a simple formula applicable in 
all cases.  Ultimately, there is no common measure of value or medium 
in terms of which values can be expressed and ranked.  We simply 
cannot rely on the ultimate commensurability of various goods if we 
seek to maximize the one true value.  “Even in success,” Raz says, “there is 
a loss, and quite commonly there is no meaning to the judgment that one 
gains more than one loses.”32  And this is what it means to say that 
environmental protection and economic development are incommensurable 
across circumstances: there is no universal, transcendental algorithm to 
establish a ranking between them. 
The tension between economic development and environmental protection 
is just one example of two goods or values that may come into conflict.  
But one can imagine other instances in which real values conflict.  For 
instance, state territorial integrity and minority self-determination also 
come into conflict.  Groups’ claims for self-determination through political 
autonomy or secession often face oppositions from states that are claiming 
to defend their territorial integrity.  Both norms are protected in international 
law.33  Skeptics can always argue that it would be relatively easy to 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. For an illuminating introduction into the legal conflict, see Lea Brilmayer, 
Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 
(1991).  Brilmayer proposes a solution to the normative conflict that recasts self-
determination claims as claims to territory.  Id. at 178.  It may well be possible to recast 
this conflict as a territorial dispute, but as she acknowledges, right now international law 
norms that uphold the principle of self-determination do not ground it in a territorial 
claim but on whether the group constitutes a distinct people.  In addition, there are 
reasons to think that self-determination claims cannot always be recast as historically 
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figure out an order or precedence between state territorial integrity and 
minority self-determination in the abstract.  Once the normative priority 
has been established, the priority of legal norms follows and the legal 
conflict is dissolved. 
This strategy is not persuasive.  There may be cases in which one of 
the values in conflict is not an actual, genuine moral value, making the 
apparent normative conflict dissolve, or where the two values can be 
rank ordered.  Although I do not have space to defend the claim here, I 
believe that this is not the case with self-determination and territorial 
integrity, and that many other values in international law come in 
incommensurable, conflicting pairs.  By subordinating one value to the 
other in the abstract, we fail to take seriously the proper moral weight of 
significant human interests that each one of the laws in question purports 
to protect. 
Nonetheless, the reality of normative conflict is still vulnerable to a 
different form of skepticism, which I will call “the legal contingency 
view.”  For every moral value, there are a number of ways to achieve the 
value through law, some of which are better than others.  Therefore, the 
relationship between morality and law has an element of contingency.  
In the United States—Shrimp case, one could imagine an argument 
that environmental protection is ill-served by trade restrictions.  Pushing 
this claim further, one could argue that changing the property regimes 
through which public fisheries and waterways are managed represents a 
more effective legal measure to protect endangered species.  If 
environmental treaties do not call for trade restrictions, they would not 
conflict with WTO agreements to liberalize trade.  Alternatively, instead 
of viewing free trade as a route to human prosperity, one could imagine 
other effective measures to promote human prosperity and would promote 
those instead.  International treaties that encourage good governance in 
poor countries provide one such example.  Then, if treaties that promote 
measures for good governance in poor countries were to replace trade 
liberalizing treaties, there would be no conflict with environmental law. 
Summing up, the “legal contingency” objection is that legal conflict is 
contingent on the particular norms promoted in international law, and 
changing those norms will help us to avoid conflict.  This is an 
important objection to the reality of normative conflict, and it raises a 
fundamental question about the path from moral norms to the legal 
 
disputed claims to territory.  For a review of what other, nonterritorial justifications may 
be offered for self-determination, see Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 
105 ETHICS 352 (1995). 
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means necessary to realize them.  I will not settle the question about this 
important theoretical and practical matter here.  But I believe this 
objection is overstated.  It may be possible to avoid certain legal conflicts 
by reframing or reworking agreements in international law, such that 
when we change certain legal norms, the value expressed in them is no 
longer in conflict with the value expressed in other norms in 
international law.  However, we cannot solve all normative conflicts in 
international law this way. 
At the heart of normative conflict is the idea that the values 
themselves are in potential conflict.  In some cases, the legal norms or 
the context in which the conflict occurs can change and thus dissolve the 
conflict.  But one cannot avoid normative conflict altogether.  At the end 
of the day, economic activity can deplete natural resources and harm 
human health to the point where it must be curtailed, and conversely, 
environmental restrictions can be too severe, such as to strangle efforts 
for economic development.  Focusing on the contingent nature of legal 
norms misses the underlying reality of moral conflict.  The dependence 
of legal conflict on contingent laws and regulations does not render it 
completely avoidable.  Even if one has reservations about the particular 
shape that these normative commitments take in international law—
about the WTO and the environmental protection treaties, which are all 
certainly imperfect—better treaties will not do away with conflict 
between genuinely different normative commitments.  Better treaties can 
anticipate the possibility of conflict and offer recommendations about 
the appropriate procedures for dealing with them, but this option is 
bound to be limited by the difficulty of anticipating the myriad ways in 
which legal norms from different regimes will interact in practice. 
Promoting diverse values in the law with divergent applications in 
practice is bound to create tensions.  This is why many legal experts 
come to realize that conflict is not an anomaly in law.  In fact, the 
Fragmentation Study claims that normative conflict is endemic in 
international law.34  The potential for conflict is inherent in any system 
of law, not just in international law.35  In domestic law, many conflicts 
are avoided because the lawmaker will specifically regulate the 
hierarchy among different legal norms.  Still, it is impossible to foresee 
 
 34. Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 58. 
 35. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 12. 
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how a new norm will interact with every existing norm, and the potential 
for conflict is always there.  This is even more true in international law, 
in which there are no formal hierarchies among all of the legal treaties, 
and consequently among the principles and values expressed in them.  
We are then left with the question of how to handle these legal conflicts 
in practice. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL NORMS 
Three types of solutions can be invoked to address conflicts in 
international law: normative, procedural, and institutional.  A normative 
solution to legal conflict involves resorting to an a priori rank ordering 
of the values embodied in international law.  To the extent that reasoning 
about the ways moral values interact in the abstract arms us with an a 
priori normative hierarchy, this hierarchy could simply be transferred to 
legal treaties to establish priorities among different norms of 
international law that embody those values.  In the domestic case, 
constitutions routinely transpose this type of a priori hierarchy of 
fundamental values and principles into law.  Constitutions are conceived 
as legal documents that protect fundamental values and principles in 
liberal political societies, whose role is to regulate conflicts that ensue 
between those fundamental norms and other practices, laws, and regulations.  
Constitutions establish formal legal hierarchies based on prior normative 
hierarchies. 
Can legal conflict in international law be handled by normative 
priorities?  This question is particularly pertinent because there is no 
international constitutional order, and consequently no formally recognized 
hierarchies in international law that establish orders of priorities among 
its different values and principles.  The possibility of normative priorities 
should be explored, but enthusiasm for such a solution should be tempered 
by a proper appreciation of pluralism and the limits it places on ordering 
moral values. 
Normative conflict in international law reflects the underlying 
pluralism of the moral universe.  If moral values are many, irreducible, 
and incommensurable, one cannot integrate all of them into an ordered 
structure that gives us a complete picture of moral priorities.  However, 
pluralists such as Berlin typically insist that just because morality is not 
tightly integrated that way, it does not mean that “anything goes.”36  In 
particular, human action must not fall below a minimum threshold of 
 
 36. See BERLIN, supra note 26. 
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human decency.  That means that there is a class of values that represent 
human interests so fundamental that few situations, if any, could justify 
departing from them.  Which values should be part of the threshold is 
disputed, but we certainly need to count the most basic human rights, 
such as rights to life and physical integrity, among the possible 
candidates for inclusion.  This minimal standard establishes a normative 
hierarchy.  In cases in which the protection of basic human rights 
conflicts with other norms of international law, those other norms 
must give way.  For example, when the protection of human rights 
conflicts with sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity has to give way.37 
Interestingly, although there are no formally recognized hierarchies, 
informal hierarchies do exist in international law.  They can help to 
address legal conflicts, and perhaps serve as the basis of a future formal 
hierarchy of international law norms.  These informal hierarchies rely 
precisely on this distinction between values that protect fundamental, 
nonnegotiable human interests, and values that are important but can be 
trumped.  Jus cogens norms represent a category of norms that are 
considered so important that derogation is never allowed.  The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Articles 53 and 64, defines 
norms of jus cogens—also known as peremptory norms—as norms 
accepted by the entire community of states and from which no 
derogation is acceptable.38  Norms of jus cogens exist above the will of 
states and limit what states can do to each other and to their own 
citizens.  A number of commonly accepted jus cogens norms begin to 
emerge despite ongoing disagreements over their scope and content: 
“prohibition of aggression, slavery and slave trade, genocide, racial 
discrimination and apartheid, torture (as defined by the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984), basic rules of international 
 
 37. There are important questions about the level of human rights violations 
necessary to limit sovereign immunity.  I think there are good practical and moral 
reasons to set the level of violations high such that only severe and widespread human 
rights violations trigger a limitation of sovereign immunity for heads of state, but I will 
leave that discussion aside. 
 38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/ 
1_1_1969.pdf. 
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humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and the right to self-
determination.”39 
The role of jus cogens in international law is significant, and it is part 
of a larger toolbox of rules—primary and secondary—that are used by 
legal practitioners to bring conflicts under familiar patterns of legal 
reasoning.  Primary rules are those that lay down rights and obligations 
for the subjects of international law, and they presuppose secondary 
rules, which are rules that stipulate how primary rules can be enacted, 
modified, and terminated.  The VCLT, which is a document drafted by 
the U.N.’s International Law Commission, represents one very important 
group of secondary rules in international law.  The VCLT lays out the 
rules under which treaties among states may be created, ratified, and 
modified.  The VCLT defines, for instance, what counts as a treaty, the 
requirements for formal consent, the procedures for determining when 
breaches of treaties have occurred, and the role and nature of jus cogens 
norms.  Norms of jus cogens have priority in two possible types of legal 
conflicts: with treaties and with customary law.  In these cases, the treaty 
or customary norm that comes into conflict with a jus cogens norm is 
simply invalidated.  There is no automatic resolution in a third type 
of case in which two norms of jus cogens clash.  According to 
VCLT, disputes that involve clashes of this sort must be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to common arbitration.40 
One example offered by recent debates over the immunity of Augusto 
Pinochet will illustrate just how jus cogens norms can work.  Augusto 
Pinochet was a former head of state of Chile, and he was alleged to have 
tortured and killed thousands of citizens of Chile and of other nations, 
including Spain and the United States, as part of an operation to 
eliminate political opponents while in office.41  Pinochet was living in 
Great Britain at the time when Spain asked the British courts to extradite 
him to be tried under the universal jurisdiction principle.42  Traditionally, 
heads of state were granted immunity under international law for acts 
committed while in office.43  The British high court, however, decided 
 
 39. Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 374; see also ALEXANDER 
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–54 (2006); Stefan 
Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and Other Rules—the Identification of 
Fundamental Norms, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 21, 27 (Christian Tomuschat & 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006). 
 40. Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 368. 
 41. Id. para. 370. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. para. 371. 
PAVEL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:53 AM 
[VOL. 46:  883, 2009]  Normative Conflict 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 899 
that jus cogens in the prohibition of torture overrides immunity for heads 
of state, and Pinochet was denied immunity on those grounds.44 
Jus cogens acts then as a minimal moral standard that establishes an 
order of importance for values that are too fundamental to human 
interests to be overridden.  So what of the other moral values in international 
law and the possibility of conflict between them?  Normative hierarchies 
can be helpful to a certain extent, but are undesirable as a comprehensive 
methodology for dealing with legal conflict.  Beyond a rudimentary but 
weighty moral baseline, conflicts cannot be settled a priori, and the 
necessity to deal with them in legal practice will remain.  That means 
that for most values that fall outside the scope of the minimal standard, 
the possibility of legal conflict is both real and enduring.  If the moral 
world is fractured, as pluralists would have us believe, then it is 
inadvisable to establish hierarchical relationships within law that rely on 
precarious orders of precedence.  To establish environmental concerns as 
taking precedence over trade concerns or vice versa at the level of 
abstract principles, so that every case that involves a conflict between 
the two are always settled in favor of the one true value, would be a 
mistake.  This move would fail to take into account the fact that 
protecting the environment and allowing trade each involve their own 
morally important interests.  A legal order that would permanently 
subordinate one interest to the other would rob us of the opportunity to 
try to distinguish how different interests interact in various contexts, and 
of the moral clarity necessary to give each interest its due. 
In addition to normative solutions, procedural norms and principles 
can also help to settle legal conflicts.  Anticipating legal conflict among 
various norms in international law, the signatories of treaties often 
articulate procedures according to which conflicts can be settled in 
international courts and tribunals.  Who may file a complaint for an 
alleged breach of treaty; the rules of evidence; whether amicus briefs 
may be submitted on behalf of either party; and terms and deadlines 
according to which all conflicts will be settled are some examples of 
procedural norms. 
 
 44. Id. para. 370.  In the end, although he lost his immunity, Pinochet was 
considered to be unfit to stand trial in Spain for health reasons.  He was set free by 
Britain and returned to Chile.  In Chile, he managed to avoid being tried for human rights 
violations for the rest of his life.  See Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, 91, Dictator 
Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at A1. 
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International law practitioners have developed procedural principles 
that allow them to respond in flexible ways to substantive problems of 
legal conflict.  International law contains interpretative maxims and 
conflict resolution techniques such as lex specialis, lex posterior, and 
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter.  Treaties are considered special law—
lex specialis—with respect to general law, and there is an established 
principle in international law that says lex specialis derogat lege 
generali—special law takes priority over general law.  This means that if 
general law does not have the status of jus cogens, from which no 
derogation is permitted, then treaties supersede general law.  So for 
instance, the ICJ decided that both human rights law, which is general 
international law, and the laws of armed conflict apply in times of war, 
but what counts as arbitrary deprivation of life in times of war comes 
from the law of armed conflict.45  The principle of lex specialis 
establishes an informal hierarchy in international law.  Lex posterior 
helps to establish temporal relations between treaties.  Lex posterior 
derogate legi priori means that more recent law prevails over earlier 
law.  Similarly, Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, signed by and binding 
on all U.N. members, also establishes orders of priority.  It states that in 
case of conflict between members’ obligations under the Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreements, the Charter 
obligations shall prevail.46 
To conclude, normative conflict in international law does not cripple 
the proper functioning of international law.  There is good reason to 
believe that the lack of formal legal hierarchies, the multiplication of 
treaties, and the general fragmentation of international law do not 
undermine legal security, predictability, or the equality of legal subjects.  
This is also the optimistic conclusion of the Fragmentation Study.47  
This is because legal conflict can be addressed first, by establishing a 
priori hierarchies among norms that protect fundamental human 
interests and other norms of international law.  Second, when such 
hierarchies are not available, the legal principles and interpretive maxims 
developed by international law practitioners for dealing with conflict 
allow for a flexible, contextual, and balanced procedural approach 
to recurring normative conflicts, which is a positive feature of the 
international law system that we should try to preserve and enhance.  
And a third and final option, the institutions of international law can 
 
 45. Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 96. 
 46. Id. para. 329. 
 47. Id. para. 492. 
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themselves be a source for settling legal conflicts.  To put this final 
option in proper context, we first need to consider the benefits and 
limitations of the existing institutional arrangements in international law. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
Normative conflicts in the law have an important institutional dimension.  
Normative conflicts come to light when disputes are submitted for 
adjudication in international tribunals.  Adjudication goes hand in hand 
with interpretation of norms, and the conflict takes shape and is made 
explicit in the process of interpretation.  Tribunals are not only instrumental 
in solving conflicts of legal norms but also in defining what constitutes a 
conflict of legal norms in the first place.  Judicial decisions are considered 
accurate statements of what the law is “between two parties and as 
applied to a particular set of circumstances, at a particular point in 
time.”48 
In the domestic case, courts play a major role in settling legal 
conflicts.49  In the United States, domestic courts settle conflicts, and a 
hierarchy of appeals to higher courts, culminating with the Supreme 
Court, seeks to ensure a consistent, uniform, and coherent interpretation 
of the law.  For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court had 
to settle a case in which the mandatory public school attendance law in 
Wisconsin conflicted with the right of the Old Order Amish community 
to practice and pass on their religion to their children, a right protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.50  The Supreme 
Court decided in favor of the Amish, holding that the State of Wisconsin 
had not established a compelling interest in mandating compulsory 
attendance for the Amish children, an interest that would override the 
interest of the Amish parents in the continuing survival of their 
community and religion.51 
In this and other cases, the conflict settling function of the Supreme 
Court derives from its authority to give final and binding judgments.  
And insofar as the Supreme Court does not challenge the decision of 
 
 48. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 110. 
 49. Obviously, not all cases settled in domestic courts are cases of legal conflict.  
Often legal disputes merely call for establishing evidence that the law has been broken—
“did he or did he not commit murder?” 
 50. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972). 
 51. Id. at 235–36. 
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lower courts, their authority too is binding and final.  The decision on a 
particular case can be reconsidered, reversed, and modified by the courts 
in subsequent cases, so all legal decisions are in principle revisable.  
Still, courts settle conflict by virtue of their institutional legitimacy as 
legal arbiters, with the Supreme Court being a legal arbiter of the last 
resort. 
No court of last resort exists in international law.  International law 
contains many dispute resolution mechanisms, and the forms they take 
vary from arbitration panels to ad hoc tribunals to permanent courts.  
What are the implications of this institutional pluralism for addressing 
normative conflict in international law?  Does it have implications for 
the likelihood of normative conflict?  Are conflicts more likely to occur 
as the number of international tribunals soars?  Would conflicts be more 
effectively resolved if the international legal system were structured 
hierarchically, in the mold of the U.S. system? 
These questions are particularly pressing given the swift development 
of international law.  Of the approximately 6000 multilateral treaties 
signed in the twentieth century,52 many have their own court or 
adjudication procedure.  This proliferation of legal forums has effects on 
the spread and likelihood of legal conflict.  For instance, different courts 
or arbitration procedures can produce conflicting judicial decisions.  
There are two types of situations that can lead to conflicting judicial 
decisions.  In the first type of situation, two tribunals could judge a case 
between the same parties on the same issue.  This would happen, for 
example, if the EC—Asbestos case were simultaneously submitted both 
to a WTO panel and an environmental treaty court.  The two tribunals 
could reach different decisions about which of the norms in conflict 
prevails.  The WTO panel may give a favorable decision for Canada, the 
complainant in this case, and ask the EC to lift its import ban on asbestos 
fibers and products containing asbestos.  At the same time, the court of 
the environmental treaty could decide the opposite, namely, that the EC 
was right to institute its ban and that it should maintain it.  This would 
create two types of problems.  First of all, it would create a difficulty for 
the parties to the dispute over which decision to follow because they are 
both binding but contradictory.  Second, over the long run it would induce 
the temptation for forum shopping.  A country will want to submit its 
 
 52. Fragmentation Study, supra note 7, para. 7 n.10 (citing CHARLOTTE KU, 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE CHANGING FACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 n.1 
(ACUNS Reports & Papers No. 2, 2001), available at http://www.acuns.org/researchli/ 
johnholmes/2001holmes/ 2001holmes). 
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dispute to the court it believes will rule favorably.  These problems 
affect the coherence and fairness of international law.  But according to 
Joost Pauwelyn, none of these problems are likely to become significant.53 
On the problem of contradictory decisions, Pauwelyn claims that this 
situation of conflicting decisions has not arisen yet, nor it is likely to 
arise in the future, and there are ways in which it can be prevented.54  
The problem may be first avoided by addressing the problem of 
overlapping jurisdictions in the treaties that give rise to the legal norms 
themselves.  States may give precedence to one tribunal over another in 
a conflict.  For instance, Article 2005 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement55 (NAFTA) states that NAFTA dispute settlement courts are 
preferred over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade56 (GATT), 
the former name for the WTO, on standards-related issues—such as 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures—or the environment.57  It obliges a 
complainant state to withdraw from a GATT dispute if the defending 
NAFTA state prefers to settle the dispute under NAFTA.58  In addition, 
the general international law principles of res judicata, “a matter already 
judged”; lis alibi pendens, “dispute pending elsewhere”; and abuse of 
process enable courts to refuse to hear a case if another court has already 
decided, or is in the process of deciding, the same dispute.59  Lis alibi 
pendens says that if a similar case is pending before a different tribunal, 
a new tribunal may refuse to exercise jurisdiction.  The doctrine of abuse 
of process, in turn, enables a tribunal to refuse to hear a case if “the 
purpose of the litigation is to harass the defendant, or the claim is 
frivolous or manifestly groundless, or the claim is one which could and 
should have been raised in an earlier proceeding.”60  These principles, if 
applied consistently, will ensure that forum shopping is discouraged as a 
general state practice in international law. 
 
 53. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 114. 
 54. Id. 
 55. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2005, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 56. For a history of GATT and the WTO, see JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND 
THE WTO (2006). 
 57. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
 58. Id. at 115. 
 59. Id. at 115–16. 
 60. Id. at 116. 
PAVEL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:53 AM 
 
904 
Finally, even if two tribunals will decide the same case—the WTO 
and an environmental court—legal scholars have made the argument that 
each tribunal should decide the case in the context of all other special 
and general international law.  A WTO panel should take into consideration 
its decisions not just WTO treaties, but also general rules of 
international law such as the VCLT and environmental treaties.  The 
claims submitted to the WTO cannot be considered in isolation.  We 
should distinguish then between the area over which a certain 
international tribunal has jurisdiction and the scope of applicable laws 
that the tribunal considers in its decisions.  The WTO, for instance, 
would not have jurisdiction over territorial disputes among states but 
only to matters related to international trade.  However, when deciding 
cases that pertain to trade, it should consider not just the WTO treaties 
and agreements but all of the applicable and relevant international 
treaties, including general international law and special treaties.61  And it 
is important to note that the WTO in both the EC—Asbestos and United 
States—Shrimp cases took note of other applicable international law 
beside the WTO treaties, and it concluded that environmental concerns 
could trump an interest in free trade.  If two courts look at the same 
applicable law, the conclusions they reach should be similar, Pauwelyn 
argues.62  This is because the applicable law for a particular set of facts 
should be the same, no matter where the case is submitted.63  In addition 
to ensuring the consistent application of the law, the legal uniformity 
generated this way should also discourage forum shopping. 
In the second type of situation, in addition to the conflict between the 
decision of two tribunals on the same matter between the same two 
parties, conflicts could arise when two tribunals interpret the same applicable 
law differently.  Two tribunals can make different pronouncements of what 
the law means, even if the disputes are different and they arise at 
different points in time.  This problem could be partially avoided if 
international tribunals refer to other tribunals’ decisions and ask for each 
other’s opinion when deciding their cases.  There is evidence that this is 
already happening.64  The WTO panel on India’s quantitative restrictions 
on imports of various products asked for the opinion of the International 
 
 61. Isabelle Van Damme claims that the WTO has consistently and effectively 
integrated general international law in the interpretation of its own treaties.  See 
ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (2009). 
 62. See PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 117. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 119. 
PAVEL FINAL ARTICLE 12/28/2009  10:53 AM 
[VOL. 46:  883, 2009]  Normative Conflict 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 905 
Monetary Fund for assessing balance of payment matters.65  However, 
the possibility of different tribunals interpreting the law differently 
remains.  How big of a problem this is for international law is disputed.  
The opinions range from optimistic to alarmist.66  The optimists believe 
that the increased number of international tribunals does not threaten the 
viability of international law.67  Pauwelyn ends on a cautious note, 
saying that at the very minimum, one needs to pay attention to how 
the proliferation of international tribunals affects the unity and 
coherence of the law.68 We should at least think about how different 
ways of structuring the institutions of the international legal system—
formally hierarchical, loosely hierarchical, or completely decentralized—
affect the possibility of normative conflicts and the solutions of those 
conflicts in practice. 
Some treaty regimes, such as trade law under the WTO, have internal 
judicial review procedures, meaning each case is settled by a panel and 
can be reviewed by the appellate body.  Strengthening such intraregime 
review procedures would ensure the consistent interpretation and 
application of the legal norms of the treaties that make up the regime.  
At the same time, judicial review can be taken a step further.  
Interregime or intertreaty legal conflicts could also be dealt with by 
higher order appeals courts.  An international appeal board to review 
decisions taken by environmental law courts and WTO panels could 
strengthen impartiality, and could ensure that specific laws are 
considered in the context of general international law.  It is not necessary 
to have a unique global legal authority, such as a U.S.-type Supreme 
Court, that has the last word on all international legal conflicts.  
Different cross-treaty appeals courts with authority divided along 
functional or geographical lines could serve the role of final arbiter.  But 
overall, the possibility of reviewing and checking the decisions of legal 
subsystems within international law through formal institutional 
hierarchies has the potential to produce more predictable and consistent 
international law. 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 123. 
 67. Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple 
International Tribunals?, in 271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101, 373 (1998), quoted in 
PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 123. 
 68. PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 123–24. 
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Finally, it is important to note that moral pluralism itself does not 
recommend an unambiguous institutional solution.  In general, moral 
theory underdetermines institutional choices.  The connection between 
moral theory and institutional design is not straightforward, as different 
institutional structures could achieve the same set of values and 
principles.  A commitment to pluralism rules out certain options, 
such as a comprehensive normative ordering of the values encrusted in 
international law.  However, it does not recommend any direct path from 
pluralism to a given institutional arrangement; therefore, the institutional 
solution necessary for dealing with conflict in international law is open-
ended from a pluralist standpoint. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Normative conflict in international law is real.  It cannot be eradicated 
by a proper reflection on the nature of the moral values, the nature of 
their relationship, or the form they take in the law.  Normative conflict is 
grounded in the pluralistic nature of the moral world, and pluralism 
defies attempts to find the ultimate unity and coherence of morality.  
Significant, however, is the fact that normative conflict does not lead to 
legal paralysis or confusing legal contradictions.  It can be addressed in 
several ways.  First, one can address normative conflict in the abstract by 
establishing a minimum baseline of values for which violations are not 
acceptable.  In addition, legal procedures and principles can significantly 
mitigate the effect of conflict in the law and bring disputes among 
conflicting legal requirements under familiar patterns of legal reasoning.  
Crucially, it may be counterproductive to come up with rigid moral 
priorities for all of the values enshrined in international law.  A legal 
order that would permanently subordinate one concern to the other 
would deprive us of the ability to distinguish how these two different 
interests interact in different contexts and of the moral clarity necessary 
to give each of the two interests their dues. 
Finally, the institutional implications are more complicated, but the 
proliferation of international tribunals in a decentralized institutional 
space need not lead to contradiction in the law or to forum shopping.  
Both can be avoided by treating special international law in the context 
of general international law.  The challenge for the current institutional 
system is to reform in a way that will lead to a more productive interplay 
of conflicting norms, one that takes pluralism seriously but also attempts 
to preserve the coherence of the international law as a system.  Although 
efforts to render coherent different parts of international law should 
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continue, it is important to note that currently, institutional fragmentation 
does not seem to disable the proper functioning of international law.  
Formal legal and judicial hierarchies could help to strengthen the ability 
of states to navigate their way through legal norms with conflicting 
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